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I. INTRODUCTION 
I am going to approach the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act 
(FCPA)1 from the standpoint of the government and public policy. 
I am very fortunate to have been able to work for the past seven 
years in a body which has as its primary interest the formulation 
of public policy, mainly by statutory enactment of moral, 
philosophical or social views; a process which sometimes adds com-
plexity and earnings to a lawyer's life. My presentation will prob-
ably touch on some of the facts and considerations that you have 
heard others speakers talk about, although I am going to give 
them a slightly different slant. I want to see how these factors im-
pact on the nation's public policy. 
II. PUBLIC POLICY CONSIDERATIONS 
BEHIND THE FCPA 
It seems to me that the paramount factors behind the passage 
of the FCP A are fourfold. The first, and one of the crucial factors, 
was the impact on the foreign policy of the United States.2 The 
bribery of high government officials by American companies, the 
illegal payment of more than four hundred million dollars to these 
officials, had serious consequences.3 We were not dealing with an 
isolated instance, or a series of isolated instances. We were deal-
ing with a pervasive behavioral pattern of the corrupti<>n of 
foreign government officials by American companies in order to 
do business. The consequences for United States foreign policy 
• Minority Counsel, Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs. 
1. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-213, §§ 102-104, 91 Stat. 
1494 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a, 78m, 78dd-1, 78dd-2, 78ff (Supp. V 1981)), reprinted in Ap-
pendix I, infra. 
2. S. REP. No. 114, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 3, reprinted in 1977 U.S. CODE CONG. & An. 
NEWS 4098, 4101. 
3. Business Accounting and Foreign Trade Simplification Act: Joint Hearings on S. 
708 Before the Subcomm. on Securities and the Subcomm. on International Finance and 
Monetary Policy of the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 97th Cong., 
1st Sess. 350 (1981). 
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were simply enormous. The Japanese government fell, the Com-
munist party was given a big leg up in Italy,4 and Third World 
emerging democracies were being subverted. In Latin America, 
once again, we became involved with antidemocratic elements. In 
short, it seems to me that the bribery episodes substantially 
subverted our stated foreign policy objectives. Our image as the 
world's leading democracy was tarnished. 
In this light, public policy could not sanction corporate foreign 
bribery. The United States could simply not permit foreign 
governments to be corrupted by citizens doing business abroad. In 
my view, it was no answer to say that we are merely following 
local customs and practice and that we would be imposing our 
moral views on the rest of the world if we proscribed bribery. The 
plain fact is that bribery of government officials is against the law 
in every society in the world. In every country where bribery has 
become known, the resulting scandal has been enormous, rocking 
the stability of every government involved with bribery. Given 
these facts, I think it was inevitible that a law would be passed to 
control the foreign policy implications of American companies cor-
rupting foreign governments. 
The second major factor leading to the passage of the FCP A 
was the impact of foreign bribery and domestic bribery on free 
market economies. We pride ourselves in having the greatest free 
market in the world. Bribery is fundamentally destructive to a 
free market. In order to function at an optimum level, in which the 
market allocates goods and services in the most efficient manner, 
purchasers and sellers must deal at arm's length, doing business 
on the basis of the price and quality of the product, with service 
being a part of the quality of the sale. Bribery undermines the free 
market: sales are no longer based on who sells the best product for 
the lowest price, but on who "pays off." The free market is so in-
grained in our society and economic theories that public policy 
measures will always opt for it. This is buttressed by the fact that, 
according to Chairman Hills of the SEC, in every industry in 
which overseas bribes were paid, some companies were able to do 
business without bribery. The impact was not only overseas, but 
also at home, with bribing firms receiving the profits and the jobs 
which might have gone to the firms that refused to engage in that 
kind of anticompetitive behavior.5 
4. H. R. REP. No. 640, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1977). 
5. See id. 
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The third important factor in the passage of the FCP A was 
the impact of the bribery scandals on corporate responsibility. The 
size and scope of the scandals necessitated a review of the new 
role of the corporation and the kind of regulation needed to ensure 
that corporations would behave as responsible citizens. Overseas 
bribes, as has been noted previously, were accomplished by the 
maintenance of off-the-books slush funds. Presidents, chief ex-
ecutives and monarchs, not lower officials at the docks, were the 
recipients of bribes. Further, not nickels and dimes, but millions of 
dollars passed hands.6 Corporate boards of directors and chief ex-
ecutive officers disclaimed knowledge or responsibility. The nar-
row concepts of disclosure under the SEC were meant to protect 
investors, but they were inadequate to deal with a substantial 
breakdown in the ability of managers of publicly-held companies 
to maintain accountability of corporate assets. 
The question was, what kind of public policy response should 
there be to the accountability problem? It seems to me there were 
two possible paths. The first would dictate the composition of the 
boards of directors of corporations, which could generate account-
ability for assets. The other alternative was to leave management, 
who knew about the corporate business, in the control of boards, 
but to require those boards to maintain accounting controls to en-
sure accountability for assets. It seems to me that the FCP A clear-
ly rejected the first option of public dictation of the composition of 
boards of directors. Instead, it opted for, in effect, good manage-
ment. Management's responsibility, by a statutory prescription, is 
to set in place a system of internal accounting controls-which, in-
cidentally, every well-managed company probably already has, or 
should have- to maintain accountability for their assets. 
Finally, the fourth, and most important reason why the FCPA 
was passed, is the impact of bribery on capital markets and the 
capital raising function. The United States is often described as hav-
ing the greatest capital market in the world. We have great 
securities firms and independent and commercial banking houses. 
This gives us a tremendous structural capability to develop and 
put capital together and sell it, not only in this country, but all 
over the world. Knowledge of the functionings of corporations 
6. See generally Lockheed Bribery: Hearings Concerning Payments to Foreign 
Government Officials by the Lockheed Aircraft Corp., and the Emergency Loan Guarantee 
Act Before the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 
(1975). 
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plays a key role, because disclosure means that investors can 
analyze what is taking place within a company. 
Public policy formulators considered bribery had the poten-
tial to subvert the capital market.7 The cynical view that bribery 
may be good for short-term profits fortunately did not prevail. 
The long-term view prevailed. Bribery can subvert long-term prof-
its. Even more important, off-the-books slush funds can compro-
mise the integrity of management. All managers of public corpora-
tions, whether in foreign sales or in purely domestic sales, should 
maintain accountability for corporate actions. 
Ill. SENATE ACTION TO AMEND THE FCPA 
Recent actions by the U.S. Senate show that the key factors I 
have discussed are essentially not debatable. In any reexamina-
tion of the FCP A, some things will not change: the United States 
will never adopt a policy that it is acceptable to corrupt foreign gov-
ernments; the United States will never permit bribery to corrupt 
a free market; the United States will always require corporations 
to behave as responsible citizens; the United States will always 
seek to preserve the integrity of its capital markets. If the law 
changes, it will have to continue to meet the public policy objec-
tives I have outlined. 
Regarding the specifics of S. 708,8 the export community 
argued very strenuously that the FCP A is an export disincentive.9 
I think we may well argue with this. The evidence is fragmentary 
and consists largely of conclusions and stories. Let us look at some 
of the basic facts. In the last four years, since the passage of the 
FCPA, our exports have doubled. We have outperformed, in the 
export market, every other country in the world, including the 
Germans, the French, the Italians, and I think we have even 
outperformed the Japanese. We have done this at a time when the 
world economy is winding down, and it is no surprise that when 
the international economy winds down, some export sales from 
domestic producers are going to be lost. 
Now, the FCPA may provide a convenient excuse for ex-
porters who wish to explain away a decline in their business. Some 
sales are in fact lost because of the FCPA. But, l believe, if con-
7. S. REP. No. 114, supra note 2, at 3. 
8. S. 708, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., 127 CONG. REC. 13,983-85 (1981). 
9. Business Accounting and Foreign Trade Simplification Act, supra note 3, 
(testimony of William Brock). 
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fronted with a situation of either paying a bribe or losing an ex-
port sale, we should never have in our lifetime a policy that in ef-
fect says: "Okay, go bribe, you have to do it to get the business." 
For example, I think the prevailing public view is that we would 
have been a lot better off had we never sold those Lockheed 
airplanes to Japan. I suppose to some extent that is a pretty rough 
thing for me say. But I do think that we live in a country where 
there are some things we just cannot do. And if other countries 
might allow such practices, then we cannot, and should not, com-
pete on that level. 
As introduced, S. 708 would have gutted the bribery law. But 
S. 708, as passed by the Senate, retains, in my judgment, the ob-
jectives that I have outlined. 
A. Accounting Provisions 
S. 708 as introduced would have amended the accounting pro-
visions to include a threshold standard of materiality. In my judg-
ment, the materiality standard is wholly inappropriate for the 
maintenance of assets accountability. Materiality may have sound 
reference to disclosure for investor protection, but I do not believe 
it has any place in the standard-setting or the responsibility of a 
board of directors to maintain the accountability for the assets of 
the corporation. 
The FCP A accounting standard is one of reasonableness, re-
quiring records to be kept accurately to maintain accountability 
for assets. The phrase inserted in the FCP A was: "in reasonable 
detail." At the time it was inserted, with the agreement of the 
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, its purpose 
was clearly, and without any controversy whatsoever, to allow the 
management of a company to set up categories of accounts so that 
they would not have to deal with every nickel and dime in the com-
pany. It was clear that the company would have the right to set up 
a reasonable accounting standard that met the further statutory 
standards of maintaining the accountability for assets. So, I do not 
think a case could be brought where there is an inadvertent mis-
take or error. 
A favorite criticism of the accounting sections is that the 
standards are too high. The argument is made that there is in the 
FCP A's accounting standards absolute liability without fault. 10 I 
10. Id. (testimony of John Subak). 
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disagree strenuously with this interpretation. At the time the 
FCP A was passed, the authors made crystal-clear that a standard 
of re.asonableness was implied,11 and within a few months 
thereafter, the Chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion, Harold Williams, said so in crystal clear language in a major 
policy pronouncement. Unfortunately, the drumbeat continued 
and S. 708 was introduced. 
The problem with the term "materiality" was spotted by the 
SEC, it seems to me, early in the game. The SEC recommended a 
definition of "materiality" based on the prudent businessman's 
test.12 That would have been fine, except, in my judgment, we are 
better off without even using the term "materiality," since its use 
would only lead to confusion. Accountability of assets necessarily 
has to have a standard higher than materiality because we are 
talking about the way a board of directors manages a company. 
The Administration, seeing the problem with the term "materiali-
ty," as I have outlined, recommended that we drop the accounting 
provisions entirely. Fortunately, the Administration's position on 
the FCP A was never seriously considered. 
S. 708, as passed in the Senate, retains the accounting provi-
sions intact, in my view. There is no standard of materiality. S. 708 
provides a defense of good faith to a company in a suit commenced 
by the Securities and Exchange Commission. It makes clear that 
the accounting requirements are to be enforced by the SEC in civil 
suits, provides that individuals cannot be held liable for less than 
knowing violations, and it provides criminal penalties if account-
ing controls are circumvented. 
I believe that if S. 708 is passed into law, it will improve on 
the different interpretation of the acco~nting requirements under 
the existing law. We can all learn, over a period of time, that the way 
things are sometimes intended and are done are not quite received 
in the same way. When that happens, I think the best thing to do is 
to reform the statute, which I think is the Senate's job. 
B. Bribery Provisions 
The FCPA currently holds a company liable where a foreign 
government official has been bribed by an agent and the company 
11. H. R. REP. No. 831, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 10, reprinted in 1977 U.S. CODE CONG. & 
An. NEws 4121, 4122. 
12. SEC Release No. 15,570, [1979 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 81,398. 
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"knows or has reason to know." Bear in mind that this is a criminal 
statute. No case can be brought unless the prosecutor is prepared 
to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the company has actual 
knowledge or acted in wanton disregard of facts which would have 
resulted in its actual knowledge. 
The statute requires companies to police their agents' activi-
ties. I ask you if this is at all unreasonable. Is it not good corporate 
management to know what your agent is up to? The current stan-
dard is a tough standard. But remember, the FCPA is intended to 
stop corruption of foreign government officials. A company cannot 
deliberately insulate itself from the fact, and escape liability for 
the act of paying a bribe. Any student of agency law will recognize 
this as ridiculous, not to mention the important foreign policy and 
economic issues at stake in foreign bribery. 
S. 708, as introduced, would have replaced the reason to know 
standards with a standard of "directly authorized." Here is what 
the Chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission, Harold 
Williams, said under the directly authorized standards: 
I am concerned with the pending Bill's deletion of the reason to 
know standards from the Act. If enacted with this deletion, it 
would be possible for management to adopt a shut-eyed approach 
whereby liability would be avoided by remaining that oblivious 
to the actual facts and circumstances underlying the subject 
transaction. Further, it would encourage a form of managerial ir-
responsibility. It should not be the underlying respect of federal 
legislation and would give rise to an environment of 'do what you 
need to do, just don't tell me.' 
Chairman Williams' testimony on this point was simply devastat-
ing, and after his testimony I do not think there was ever any 
hope that that language could have passed without amendment. 
Following the testimony, the Banking Committee undertook a 
bipartisan effort to find a solution to the problem. S. 708, as pass-
ed in the Senate, continues the "directly authorized" language 
modified by the terms "explicitly or by course of conduct." I sub-
mit that an authorization by "course of conduct" is a workable 
standard that should proscribe bribery. 
I do not happen to think that a case would ever have been 
brought based upon the "has reason to know" standard that could 
not meet the test I have described, and if it were I think it would 
have gotten thrown out of court. Certainly it would have been 
thrown out of the Court of Appeals. But we have to live with 
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perceptions, and so I think it is right, at this point, to take up the 
amendment as it stands. In any event, I think the language: 
"directly authorizes explicitly or by course of corporate conduct" 
is fine substitute language, and I am hopeful that it is language 
that will prevail because it is tantamount to "know or have reason 
to know" as illegal standard. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
As I have said, the Senate undertook the amendment of the 
FCP A on a bipartisan basis, with a unanimity about the need to 
revise the statute, and unanimity about how the statute ought to 
be revised. Now, I believe that the House Committee is going to 
give this matter very serious consideration. I know that we are in 
an election year. I know with the economic situation being what it 
is, politics will undoubtedly play a very important role in what 
bills are going to come up and which bills are going to pass. Never-
theless, I don't think that the amendment of the FCP A is one of 
those pieces of legislation that falls into the political category. I 
think that it is above, or set apart from, the social, economic, and 
political issues. 
My information is that the House Committee is going to be 
working on its own formulation of amendment to the FCP A. It will 
come as no surprise to anybody that the House members think 
that they have the right to proceed in their own fashion. They 
might even feel that they have an obligation to do something a lit-
tle different than the Senate has done. Nevertheless, they are go-
ing to be formulating their own bill. They are going to take a 
slightly different approach than the Senate Bill. Perhaps their ap-
proach will be keyed more to the criminalization provisions. I just 
do not know to what extent they will change the accounting provi-
sions. I hope that, after having arrived at the consensus that we 
did arrive at in the Senate on the accounting provisions, that, 
unless it can really be improved upon, the better part of valor 
might be to leave it alone. We had a consensus, as I say, on both 
sides of the aisle. Part of the consensus, I believe, was the whole 
business community. Everybody seemed to be pleased with it, the 
United States Chamber of Commerce, and, in the end, the AICPA, 
and so on. 
I think we have struggled now, if we go back to the origins of 
this, for about seven years, and after a lot of gnashing of teeth, we 
seem to have arrived at the point where everybody is feeling very 
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comfortable with the accounting provisions as they have come out 
of the Senate. I sincerely hope, because I believe that public policy 
needs this Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, that we have done a 
good job. I also believe that we have finally done something that 
everybody can live with and still accomplish a valid public policy 
purpose. I believe very strongly that the Senate's action with 
respect to the accounting provisions accomplishes those basic pur-
poses. 
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